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Reflections from a post-9/11 New York lecture hall
In January 2002, weeks after the Twin Towers fell, a journalist addressed Columbia University's journalism students. The city still carried the scars of September 11, visible in the weary expressions of its residents. The speaker recalled the post-World War II order that America had shaped-military victories, the Marshall Plan, and the spread of democracy across Western Europe.
For many in the audience, the words resonated deeply. One young student, tears streaming down his face, later approached the speaker. "America needs to hear this from its foreign friends right now," he said. "We feel raw, vulnerable."
"Your generation-and mine-has been lucky. We grew up in a world where rules, not brute force, governed international relations."
Yet another student, newly arrived from Pakistan, offered a starkly different perspective. He compared the U.S. to Imperial Rome: a benevolent protector within its walls but an unchecked force beyond them.
"If you live inside the Imperial Citadel, American power feels like safety, law, democracy. If you live on the fringes, it feels like impunity."
Pakistani student, Columbia Journalism School, 2002
The rules-based order's uneven legacy
The student's critique foreshadowed a debate now central to global politics. The post-war order, he argued, had never been truly universal. The U.S. and its allies often exempted themselves from the rules they championed-enforcing trade asymmetrically, applying international law selectively, and intervening in weaker nations with little accountability.
Historian Christopher Sabatini, a Latin America expert at Chatham House, traces this pattern to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Initially framed as a shield against European recolonization, it evolved into a justification for U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. "American policymakers who advocate unilateral intervention? I call them 'backyard-istas,'" Sabatini said. "They see Latin America as their sphere."
Examples abound: the 1953 CIA-backed coup in Iran to protect British oil interests; the 1954 overthrow of Guatemala's elected government to safeguard United Fruit Company profits; the 1983 invasion of Grenada, a Commonwealth realm. These actions, Sabatini notes, were never deterred by the rules-based order the U.S. helped establish.
Trump's America First: A return to 19th-century power politics
At Davos last week, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney declared the rules-based order effectively dead. "This is a moment of rupture," he said, urging middle powers to unite. His speech earned a rare standing ovation, signaling a shift among allies who once relied on U.S. leadership.
President Donald Trump's second-term agenda, outlined in the December National Security Strategy, prioritizes "America First" through economic sanctions, tariffs, and military leverage. The goal: to compel smaller nations to align with U.S. interests. Historian Jay Sexton likens Trump's approach to 19th-century Great Power politics-volatile, unpredictable, and driven by spheres of influence.
"The difference now? America's friends are on the receiving end," Sexton said. "Europeans and Canadians are experiencing what others have long known: arbitrary U.S. power."
Trump's recent remarks about NATO allies-claiming they "stayed back" in Afghanistan-sparked outrage in the UK. Prime Minister Keir Starmer called the comments "insulting and appalling." After a call with Trump, Starmer's office reported the U.S. president later praised UK troops as "among the greatest warriors."
Greenland: A turning point for allies
Trump's demand to purchase Greenland from Denmark marked a watershed. His dismissive comment-"Denmark has only added one more dog sled" to defend the territory-revealed a contempt for European sovereignty. The backlash was swift. Allies, who had previously used flattery (e.g., NATO's Mark Rutte calling Trump "daddy") to manage relations, began resisting.
Canada's Carney framed the moment as a call to action. "If you're not at the table, you're on the menu," he warned. The result? A sudden cohesion among middle powers. Even Trump's tariff threats evaporated when allies refused to bend.
The challenge for middle powers
At the 2004 D-Day anniversary in Normandy, aging veterans visited the graves of fallen comrades. Their generation had built the post-war order to prevent a return to Great Power rivalries-a system where "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."
Today, that order is unraveling. Trust in democratic institutions has eroded amid economic stagnation and inequality, fueled by social media and AI-driven misinformation. Trump's rise may be a symptom, not the cause, of this decline.
"Democracy, rule of law, accountable government-they're not natural," Carney said. "They must be fought for, sustained, defended."
The question now: Can middle powers fill the void left by U.S. retrenchment? Or will the world revert to an era where might makes right?
